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Neglected by scholars and journalists alike, the years of conflict in Vietnam from 1968 to 1975 offer surprises not only about how the war was fought, but about what was achieved. Drawing from thousands of hours of previously unavailable (and still classified) tape-recorded meetings between the highest levels of the American military command in Vietnam, A Better War is an insightful, factual, and superbly documented history of these final years. Through his exclusive access to authoritative materials, award-winning historian Lewis Sorley highlights the dramatic differences in conception, conduct, and--at least for a time--results between the early and later years of the war. Among his most important findings is that while the war was being lost at the peace table and in the U.S. Congress, the soldiers were winning on the ground. Meticulously researched and movingly told, A Better War sheds new light on the Vietnam War.
Amazon Exclusive Essay: "New Vietnam War History" by Lewis Sorley, Author of A Better War 
For a long time most people thought the long years of American involvement in the Vietnam War were just more of the same--with a bad ending. Now we know that during the latter years, when General Creighton Abrams commanded U.S. forces, almost everything changed, and for the better. Abrams understood the nature of the war and devised a more availing approach to the conduct of it. Building up South Vietnam's own armed forces got high priority, whereas before they had been neglected and allowed to go into combat outgunned by the enemy. The covert infrastructure which through terror and coercion kept South Vietnam's rural population under domination was painstakingly rooted out, not ignored as earlier. And combat operations were greatly improved, concentrating on large numbers of patrols and ambushes designed to provide security for the people rather than cumbersome large-unit sweeps through the deep jungle. Some commentators have called the description of these changes "revisionist" history, but actually it is new history. Virtually all the better-known earlier books about the war concentrated heavily on the early years, leaving the later period grossly neglected. New insight came importantly from a collection of hundreds of tape recordings of briefings and staff meetings in General Abrams's headquarters during the four years he commanded in Vietnam. They are filled with human drama, professional debate, successes and frustrations, and ultimately a hard-won triumph, told in the voices of Abrams and his senior associates; such visiting officials as the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and a succession of often brilliant briefing officers. Later, of course, what they had won was thrown away by the United States Congress, but the story of their better war is still a dramatic testament to courage, integrity, devotion, and professional competence.--Lewis Sorley
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Average Customer Rating:   Poor, repetitive 'history' Better titled "The Creighton Abrams Hagiography Project", this book makes it's only worthwhile points in the first chapters -- 'clear and hold' is a good idea and that good intelligence information is something to aim at. Other than that, this piece of garbage jumps around from topic to topic, and has the added annoyance of reams of italicized words to give emphasis to Abrams' incessant, profane bloviating. I am second to none in my appreciation of Abrams' abilities and accomplishments, but calling this a 'history' is like calling a Big Mac haute cuisine. Read ;this book... the White House did before deciding the new Afghanistan policy This is a book that should have been written in the seventies... then at least the persons responcible for the the debical that was the Vietnam surrender could have paid for their poor and self driven choices... I only wish I had know about all of the background when I first entered the US Army in 1968... Interesting new facts, but incomplete and slanted Opinions are so deeply divided on the Vietnam War, and there is so much misinformation routinely repeated by both "hawks" and "doves" that every new book on the subject needs critical examination and cross-checking. Lewis Sorely's "A Better War" provides some new interesting facts about the military situation in Vietnam late in the war, and recounts many stories from the point of view of Creighton Abrams, who was William Westmoreland's successor as commander of U.S. forces starting in 1968. But the book advocates for the idea that Abrams turned the war around to the point that the U.S. was winning, and would have won if we had not withdrawn when we did. Sorely presents the facts slanted unrealistically towards that point of view, and ignores a large amount of contrary evidence. If you are interested in the Vietnam war, and are studying all the pertinent literature, "A Better War" is worth reading along with the rest, and presents a worthwhile point of view from one of the major participants who has been neglected up until now. But if this is the only book you read on Vietnam, you will be left with the distorted impression that the U.S. could have and should have achieved victory in the form of an independent, sustainable, non-communist South Vietnam, if the politicians and anti-war movement would have left the military alone to do its job a little while longer.
"A Better War" starts with the Tet offensive and complains that most Vietnam War literature ends there, assuming the war was lost at that point. Then this book commits the opposite offense, assuming that you can understand the Vietnam War starting with the Tet offensive and proceeding to the end of the war. The situation in modern Indochina did not start in 1968, but in 1858 with Napoleon's colonization. Four years of well-executed military effort may seem like a reasonable time to win a war, but not against the backdrop of over 100 years of colonial exploitation, botched diplomacy, and previous military mismanagement. There are plenty of arguments, unexamined by this book, about why Abrams' efforts were too little too late and the "victory" that Sorely claims didn't stick. On the positive side, this book does help dispel some of the mythology of the anti-war movement- that most of our soldiers were brutal baby-killers and our generals were incompetent. I wasn't aware that the U.S military had changed in 1968 from Westmoreland's disastrous attrition strategy to Abrams' more reasonable and seemingly effective strategy of "clear and hold" of rural villages and hamlets. "A Better War" is worth reading for those facts, but I wish Sorely had presented his material in a more objective way. Don't read this without also reading "The Pentagon Papers" and Barbara Tuchman's "The March of Folly." The Politics of the Vietnam War Sorley confirms with full documentation my conviction that Nixon and Congress failed to keep the promises made to our allies and gave victory to our enemies. Debunking Many Vietnam Myths This book brings to light some interesting thoughts about the Vietnam War including:
- How wrong General Westmoreland's focus on kills and large scale engagements were
- How General Abrams' focus on securing the countryside "won" the war
- "The U.S.A. position in South Vietnam was stronger at the end of 1972 than at any previous point in the war"
- How the U.S.A. "lost" the war by Congress not continuing to fund South Vietnam requests for air support and materiel
- The effectiveness of B-52 bombing, harbor mining and the tactical air and sea support that the U.S.A. provided the South Vietnamese armed forces
- The relative safety in Saigon and the countryside of Vietnam by 1971 - "1,221 servicemen killed in Vietnam and 1,647 killed violently in New York City" - 1,823 according to [...]
- The rejection of the Viet Cong by the South Vietnamese people
- The Paris Peace Treaty not making the North Vietnamese leave South Vietnam - "the most murderous truce this century"
- 70% of U.S.A. forces were volunteers |  |
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