Game Theory: Analysis of Conflict,   ISBN:9780674341166

Customer Rating: 

This book treats all the principal arguments of actual game theory. But particullary it studies the Bayes theorem. The importance of this fact is known also in biology and in the information theory. The tree strategies have the possibility to converge at equilibria. Myerson analyses the method for stabilizing also random subcessions.

Customer Rating: 

This book is highly recommended for those starting in game theory and need its mathematical background.
It covers everything it should in a concise and accurate way. It is not for those not interested in the math underlying the theory.
If your choice is between Myerson's, and Rubinstein and Osborne's "A course in Game Theory", I would choose Myerson's for a first course, it's more detailed and therefore better for self study.

Customer Rating: 

This is a great book, containing an incredible wealth of knowledge. It's all explained very well, by one of the premier game theory experts in the world (who also won the Nobel Prize, by the way). I'm not surprised at all to see that this book has been reviewed by several Ph D students.

The only problem is that it's a difficult read. Don't be fooled by the word "introduction" in the description: this book is packed with mathematics, and is written in a very dense, academic style. If you want a more lighthearted introduction to game theory, without all the equations, I highly recommend "Thinking Strategically" by Dixit and Nalebuff. It may not be quite as substantive as this tome, but it's a much better choice for the semi-casual reader.

Customer Rating: 

A wonderful book that introduces the subject rigorously, but also provides exceptional intuition, examples, and understanding.

Customer Rating: 

Even though Myerson asserts that this book is intended to be "a general introduction to game theory" in Preface, it is difficult to understand for beginners who have not mathematics knowledge in the level of upper class. In this point, the volume is different from other introductions - e.g. Morton Davis' "Game Theory"-, rather is suitable for M.A. or first year Ph.D students. However, this book is not so much for students majoring economics as for various social sceintists in the sense that it does not focus on only "economics" but on pure game "theory" in nearly all areas.